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ABSTRACT
NOWHERE TO GO: INFORMAL SETTLEMENT ERADICATION IN KIGALI,
RWANDA
Emily E. Benken
May 2016
Following the new world order of the post-Cold War era, the rise of
developmentalism stressed the moral necessity of installing capitalist models of growth in
the global south. The reproduction of narratives of modernity and teleological
progression were reproduced in numerous African cities and actualized in policies related
to urban development. The consequent trend of urbanization has been the systemic
eradication of informal settlements and large-scale displacement to make way for
modern, productive urban areas.
One site of this pattern is Kigali, Rwanda. Since the turn of the century, official
“vision projects” released by the Rwandan government have reimagined the capital as a
modernized city. The manifestation of these policies has displaced thousands of informal
housing residents from the more economically desirable parts of Kigali to the periphery
of the city. Though national narratives surrounding development push for equity,
improved quality of life, and inclusion for all Rwandans, the policies reflect a profitdriven privatization of urban spaces. Reflected in global south cities worldwide, urban
spaces have become increasingly exclusive on the basis of socio-economic position.
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This research focuses on the emergence of this pattern in Kigali in the Agatare
Cell, where the construction of a road stipulated the eviction of 43 informal settlement
households. After conducting interviews with all affected households, the qualitative data
was interpreted using an inductive coding technique. Alongside quantitative data
surrounding the demographics of the area the following themes emerged: significance of
place, concerns about compensation, land security, monopolization of information, civic
duty associated with development, and safety concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
The government-sponsored promotional video for Vision 2020—a development
plan to “transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by the year 2020”—is expertly
produced (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012:). A camera pans over an imagined cosmopolitan
area with innumerable skyscrapers, pedestrian skywalks, and neatly trimmed parks while
a feminine British voice narrates the envisioned city with words like “pristine,” “alfresco,” and “urbanites” (Niyongabo 2013). Finally, the video displays Kigali in its
present state. It briefly scans a wide landscape of crowded informal settlements, only to
quickly sweep the sight away with an exaggerated visual effect. A single, large villa-style
house is revealed while the accompanying narration states, “existing urban areas will
transform into well-planned communities” (Niyongabo 2013). Though the term “slum” is
never explicitly used, the homogenous and desolate portrayal of informal settlements
suggests a parallel to the prejudice attached to the outdated term.

Figure 1

1

Figure 2

This seven-minute promotional video provides a concise demonstration of two
contradicting narratives at play in Rwandan urban development. One narrative
emphasizes inclusivity and the improvement of quality of life for all Rwandans, whereas
the other stresses the development of the country and “cleaning” urban areas (Manirakiza
2014:161). This contradiction is best captured in one scene that claims Vision 2020 “will
ensure that everyone will have a place to stay,” while focused visually on a sprawling
business sector with aesthetically appealing shopping centers, skyscrapers, and expansive
parks (Niyongabo 2013). Regardless of its multiple assurances to promote equitable
housing, Vision 2020 does not provide an answer to housing Kigali’s current informal
settlement residents, which comprise 66 percent of the population (Ansoms and Rostagno
2012:427).
Recent research in numerous disciplines has recognized a regional and global
pattern of state-sanctioned informal settlement eradication rooted in discourses of
modernity (see Huchzermeyer 2011; Huggins 2010; Sasken 2014). This paper contributes
to the growing niche by analyzing the manifestation of this pattern in Kigali, Rwanda.
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Specifically, it investigates the theories and practices within urban development that
contribute to large-scale displacement.
I approached this topic though ethnographic research conducted in an informal
neighborhood in Kigali called Agatare.1 The area was selected as the result of an
impending Vision 2020 project that planned to eradicate over 40 plots for the
construction of a road (City of Kigali 2014). Drawing upon a theoretical framework
grounded in developmentalism and nationalism, I argue that Rwandan urban
development projects promote a narrative of moral responsibility to improve the living
conditions of informal settlements, yet the policies themselves prioritize the privatization
of settlements to maximize profit. This pattern can be located within the structure of
economic globalization and the capitalist values reproduced through the influence of
international actors and a strong sense nationalism.
This paper is divided into five sections: a literature review, an overview of the
conceptualization of slums, a discussion of the geographical and social conditions in
Rwanda, an overview of informal settlements in Kigali, and data analysis.
The literature review situates exclusionary urban development practices in a wider
context of the history of anthropology and the emergence of developmentalism,
nationalism, and structuralism. The next section situates Kigali’s informal settlements
within an expansive history of “slums” (a term frequently and problematically used
interchangeably for “informal settlements”) and the origins of “slum upgrading

Though Agatare is actually the name of a cell in the Nyarugenge District, residents and
local policy-makers referred to the neighborhood exclusively as Agatare in conversation
and documents.
1
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methods.” This section also includes a case study that details the eradication of an
informal settlement with similar physical and social conditions to Agatare.
The third section explicates relevant topographical and geographical conditions of
the city and how these conditions have influenced urban planning and development over
time. It then details the development goals of the Rwandan government, including its
smaller, spatially specific plans and all-encompassing visions of development.
The fourth section provides a general overview of informal settlements in Kigali
including general conditions and locations, proposed future upgrading, and upgrading
mechanisms used in Rwanda. Finally, the fifth section goes into the original data
description and analysis, including research methods, emergent themes, and a conclusive
analysis.
Applying this theoretical framework to the narratives of informal settlement
residents as voiced in the interviews, I critically examine the factors impacting patterns of
displacement in Kigali. By contributing to a growing breadth of research, I hope to
uncover the normalization of inequality within urban development and potentially
influence future development policies. As it stands, the machine of urban modernization
in Kigali—and throughout the world—threatens the structure of an equitable urban
society. Physically, it continually forces informal settlements to the periphery of the city,
which reproduces and often exacerbates existing living conditions and opportunities
within informal settlements; ideologically, it endorses the idea of exclusive access to “the
city” on the basis of wealth and status.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Cultural Evolutionism & Developmentalism
Throughout the history of social sciences, disparate ontological theories have
emerged within larger discourses. At certain points in time, specific approaches have
been heralded as the accepted truth, only to be rebuked by later academics as problematic
or outdated. Although wider discourses have changed over time in order to compensate
for new information, accepted paradigmal thought is still influenced by the specter of
social sciences past. In anthropology this pattern is especially significant, as many past
theories—though no longer ideologically accepted—still have material consequences in
contemporary policy formation.
Tracing the history of anthropology back to the nineteenth century, the origins of
developmentalism lie with Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917) and his theory of cultural
evolutionism (Kuper 2005:32). Tylor was heavily influenced by Darwinian thought, as
evidenced by his direct application of biological evolutionary concepts to societal
differences (Kuper 2005:33). Tylor argued that cultures could be ranked by “relative
sophistication” according to a “hierarchical social order” (Kuper 2005:34). On the basis
of this logic, Tylor also argued that cultures would progress over time from primitive to
advanced, passing through the stages of savagery, barbarism, agricultural, and industrial
to finally emerge as a modern civilization (Erickson and Murphy 2013:29).
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Many anthropologists of the time viewed culture as naturally progressing through these
linear stages of development, and that the surviving “primitive” cultures could be
understood as a sort of relic of the past of “modern” cultures (Erickson and Murphy
2013:30).
After decades of championing anthropological research, Tylor’s theories became
increasingly outdated with Franz Boas’ (1858-1942) more historically informed theory of
cultural relativism (Kuper 2005:115). This approach was central to ethnographic studies
until the political climate shifted significantly with the onset of the Cold War. This period
brought about the demonization of communism, pitting the ideological constructs of
capitalism and communism against one another (Haynes 1996:1080). In 1947, the
Truman Doctrine brought the Cold War into an international arena by vowing United
States intervention in the case of Soviet Union expansion (Heale 1996:1080). This
interventionist approach appealed to the logic of cultural evolutionism by implying the
teleological notions of staged progress. Whereas Tylor’s theories applied social
evolutionism to cultures, developmentalism applied it to macroeconomics (Pearce
1999:395). W. W. Rostow’s influential “Non-Communist Manifesto” directly mirrored
Tylor’s stages of cultural progression, imagining societies as evolving from “traditional”
to “age of high mass consumption” rather than from “primitive” to “advanced” (Rostow
1960:4). Similarly to Tylor’s assertion that all cultures followed a singular, teleological
progression, Rostow insisted that, in order to reach economic maturity, all economies
must grow along the axis of capitalism in order to achieve contemporary comforts and
modernization (Rostow 1960:4).
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Rostow’s theories extended into other disciplines, fueling developmentalist
thought and over time concretizing a perceived binary between capitalist and communist
models of growth. The capitalist model stressed the increase of internal productivity,
whereas the communist model stressed the redistribution of power and wealth (OliverSmith 2010:13). This binary was reproduced in developmentalist theory commonly
employed by anthropologist of the time, which emphasized the inevitable progression of
the global south as a “universal trajectory […] of a ‘civilizing’ process” (Ferguson
1997:162). In this paranoia-fueled political landscape, cultural evolutionism reemerged,
but displaced the evolution of culture to the field of macroeconomics (Haynes
1996:1080). After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new world order declared
capitalism “triumphant as the guide to improving human welfare” (Oliver-Smith
2010:15).
In his description of the immediate consequences of the Cold War, Arturo
Escobar states “the industrialized nations of North America and Europe were supposed to
be the indubitable models for the societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the socalled Third World, and [now] these societies must catch up with the industrialized
countries, perhaps even become like them” (Escobar 1995:3). This call for a specific
brand of Western progression gave the global north an assumed authority regarding the
welfare of the “Third World” and various international financial institutions sprung up to
address this issue. The maximization of productive capability central to capitalism was
extended to the built environment, and global north institutions and policies asserted that
the expansion of infrastructure was synonymous with economic growth and central to
pulling the “Third World” out of poverty (Oliver-Smith 2010:6). Institutions like the
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World Bank and the International Monetary Fund began to allot massive multilateral
loans for the development of infrastructure development, beginning a new era of
developmentalism (Ferguson 1997:180).
Though developmentalism is becoming increasingly outdated—especially in the
field of anthropological research—the effects of the ideology are still palpable. Most
notably, many countries in which developmentalist policies were aimed remain in
massive amounts of debt to international financial institutions (Ferguson 1997:147).
Additionally, developmentalist concepts based in capitalist values are still prioritized in
domestics and internationally sponsored development projects. This reproduction of a
capitalist drive for maximum productivity frequently overlooks the needs of vulnerable
members of society, such as the residents of informal settlements.

The “African City” as an Object of Theory
Though most contemporary anthropologists reject the outright use of
developmentalism, interpretive theories rooted in developmentalist thought have
concretized in urban studies. As a result, the conceptualization of the “African city” is
heavily informed by these theories, which in turn shapes urban development policies.
Considering the heavy influences of cultural evolutionism on theories of
developmentalism as explicated above, such policies are rarely beneficial to the
individuals living in these cities.
In Global and World Cities: A View from off the Map, Jennifer Robinson explores
this influence on urban studies, citing that many African cities “do not register on
intellectual maps that chart the rise and fall of global and world cities” (Robinson

8

2002:531). That is, there is no defined space for African cities within the parameters of
urban studies, which leads to their exclusion from theory. Rather than being conceived of
as singular products of a specific time and space, cities in the global South cities are
“interpreted […] through the lens of developmentalism” (Robinson 2002:531). This lens
relies heavily upon an underlying narrative of modernization that insinuates a teleological
pattern of urban growth. Consequently, this pattern portrays African cities as
“unfinished” or “undeveloped” because they lack the “qualities of city-ness” that most
global north cities possess; namely, exclusively formal housing and a modernized
aesthetic (Robinson 2002:531).
This assumed pattern of urban growth presents a major fallacy in its application to
African cities. The urbanization process in the global south is profoundly impacted by
factors stemming from its detrimental position in the post-colonial, neoliberal global
economy (Ferguson 1997:158). Adverse conditions to development, including
repercussions associated with foreign occupation, massive debts to the World Bank, and
violence incited by past imperial forces, present roadblocks to urbanization that were not
a factor in the global north (Ferguson 1997:158). As a result, the axis of growth along
which African cities grow is not nearly as linear as that which European and American
cities grew.
This reimagining of African cities as developmentalist projects is not just
ideologically problematic, but also has serious material consequences informed by
structuralist systems. In Claude Lévi-Strauss’ approach to structuralism, the material
world is interpreted by means of binary opposition (Lévi-Strauss 2013[1984]:157). That
is, all objects derive meaning from their exact opposite: abstract/concrete, black/white,
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ideal/material. Binary oppositions are intrinsically interdependent; neither has meaning
without contrast of its opposition, yet they can never occupy the same space of meaning
(Lévi-Strauss 2013[1984]:157). In the realm of idealism, binary oppositions use language
to create meaning from nontangible concepts; in the realm of materialism, however,
where objects already exist outside of language, binary oppositions become problematic.
If one material derives meaning from its opposition to another material or the absence of
another material, normative and deviant values are also inevitably assigned.
As applied to urban development in African cities, structuralism assigns values
within the binary of “developed” and “undeveloped.” Using discrete values rather than
continuous values, housing becomes informal or formal; legal or illegal; taxed or
untaxed. Rather than falling onto a spectrum, informal houses are forced into a singular,
homogenous identity. By forcing all housing into such narrow categories, policies are not
able to capture the diversity of urban life (Johannesburg 2008:3). In Cities with Slums,
Marie Huchzermeyer criticizes this conception of informality as a singular sector of
housing, arguing that the diversity and multiplicity of interactions within informal
settlements connect different economies and spaces to one another. This entwinement of
informal economic structures with the social fabric of a given community constructs
unique and subversive peripheral spaces (Huchzermeyer 2011:97). Characterizing this
periphery, Simone states “the formal and the informal, and movement and home are
brought into a proximity that produces a highly ambiguous sense of place” (Simone
2004:2). Though this sense of place is constructed in part by the marginalization and
exclusion of informal settlements, it continues to expand and transform to create meaning
from adverse living conditions.
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Regardless of this complexity, informal housing is conceived of in policy as the
absence of formality and an aspect in African cities that should be “fixed.” Though the
developmentalist vision of progress would have the cities growing linearly, the continual
creativity produced in informal settlements has created urban growth along unknown
axes.
To synthesize these various perspectives of the “African city” as an object of
theory, consider Sarah Nuttall and Achille Mbembe’s words from Johannesburg: the
Elusive Metropolis:
“It is not the material infrastructure or the built form that make the city a city.
The city, in a way, exists beyond its architecture. The built form is not, or is no
longer, the product of a careful planning or engineering of the urban space. It is,
rather, produced randomly as a living space more and more reduced to its most
basic functions, that of a shelter, the heterogeneous conglomeration of truncated
urban forms, fragments and reminders of material and mental urban elsewhere.”
[Nuttall and Mbembe 2008:2]
In consideration of Kigali as an “object of theory,” the country’s current
structure of urban development conceptualizes the city in terms of binary
oppositions. As evident in the Vision 2020 video referenced in the introduction,
informal settlements throughout the country are grouped together and conceived of
as a unit; a singular issue to be fixed with one solution.

Nationalism
In his theories on nationalism, Benjamin Anderson claims that a nation is an
“imagined political community” (Anderson 1983:22). He goes on to explain:
“It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds
of each lives the image of their communion. It is imagined as a community
because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in
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each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”
[Anderson 1983:22, emphasis added]
By Anderson’s logic, though the arbitrary boundaries that make up nations do
not inherently ascribe meaning to space, material meaning is derived from the
membership to the nation.
Anderson goes on to characterize nations as having three distinct features. All
nations are: 1) limited, in that they have defined boundaries that indicate who is and
who is not a member, 2) sovereign, in that they are the source of political authority,
and 3) community-forming, in that they secure devotion of members to the extent that
many are willing to die for their nation (Anderson 1983:6-7).
A nation’s fulfillment of these characteristics, according to Anderson, then
produces and perpetuates nationalism (Anderson 1983:7). As one of millions within a
population, how is the individual member affected by the collective identity of the
imagined community? The influence of collective identity can be positive, such as
instigating a sense of belonging and altruism toward other members. Conversely, the
implications of a collective identity can be negative. The groupthink that nationalism
encourages is inherently exclusionary; if you are not a member of a nation with a
specific set of goals and characteristics, you are by default an outsider, who may
belong to a nation with contradictory goals. Historically, this atmosphere of exclusion
has taken the form of racism, anti-Semitism, and systemic violence (Arendt 1951:2).
As evidenced by conflicts throughout history, the stronger an imagined
community is, the more intense nationalism within the community becomes, which in
turn increases the likelihood of external conflict. Consider, for example, two
neighboring nations as defined by Anderson’s terms: both nations are limited and
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have access to different resources; both are sovereign and have two distinct sources of
political authority; and both are community-forming to the extent that the identities of
individual members are inseparable from the identity of the nation. Hypothetically, if
one nation’s boundary contained a resource considered valuable to the neighboring
nation’s political authority, this nation has the ability to take the resource by force
simply by mobilizing the imagined community. Under the influence of nationalism,
members can be more easily manipulated by political authorities to work towards the
wellbeing of the nation. Even if the cause is not clear, the threat of the wellbeing of
the collective identity can often be enough to cause violent mobilization.

Constructed Nationalism in Rwanda
These constructions of nationalism are uniquely applicable to Rwanda
because its most historically significant conflicts have been mostly internal. The
systemic killing of over 1 million Rwandans during the 1994 genocide signified the
loss of internal cohesion and the perceived loss of a collective identity (Straus and
Waldorf 2011:3-4). Following their complete military victory, the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) took control of the government and sought a solution to the ethnic
divisiveness perceived among Rwandans. Conversely to the formation of the
European Union that sought to reduce nationalism, the RPF sought to increase
nationalism by eliminating all identities and labels other than “Rwandan” (Straus and
Waldorf 2011:4). As opposed to an organic emergence, nationalism became statesanctioned, which many scholars refer to as “state building” (Purdeková 2008:502).
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To commence this process, the RPF-led government quickly “[undertook] a
series of dramatic political, economic, and social projects” to “alter social identities,
cultural norms, and individual behavior” (Straus and Waldorf 2011:5). According to
the Rwandan government, these actions were meant to prevent future violence, as
“the prior social order produced genocide, so radical change is needed to prevent a
future recurrence” (Straus and Waldorf 2011:5). Reshaping individual behavior began
with prohibiting the use of any perceived divisive identity terminology that was not
state-approved. This prohibition began with using prohibited identifiers in public
conversation (e.g., Hutu, Tutsi, or any other ethnic or culturally specific label), which
was punished by “public shaming campaigns, labeling of individuals as genocidaires,
and […] formal charges” (Purdeková 2008:509). This was followed in 2003 by the
adoption of several thought and speech crimes, including “divisionism,” “ethnic
ideology,” and “genocide mentality” (Hintjens 2008:10). These “replacement”
policies are meant to deconstruct and reform Rwandans’ self-perception and the
perception of social categories around them, thereby contributing to a collective
identity (Purdeková 2008:510).
Academics have been deeply critical of this state-sanctioned nationalism as a
force of homogenization (see Burnet 2012; Sommers 2012; Uvin 1998). The
prohibition of nuanced sub-identities limits the representation and protection of
marginalized populations in Rwandan law (Straus and Waldorf 2011:11). In
interviews with marginalized Rwandans that included “peasants, Hutu prisoners,
Tutsi survivors, or youth” Straus and Waldorf describe a trend of “expressions of
exclusion and marginalization […] accompanied by a palpable sense of fear and
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alienation” (Straus and Waldorf 2011:11). Rwandan laws are based mostly on the
representation of “narrow, elite […] Anglophone Tutsi returnees in in Kigali” (Straus
and Waldorf 2011:11). The consequences of this narrow representation are intensified
by the social taboo surrounding open criticism of authority in Rwanda (Hintjens
2008:7).
During my time in Kigali, many experiences and conversations alluded to
Lars and Waldorf’s description of the fear of dissent and consequent silencing. Even
casual conversation with acquaintances became awkward when the topic of
government control arose. During interviews, discussions of the government were
generally met with no dissent and overall praise; there are frequent references to the
goodness of Rwandan government in national media sources, there were multiple
political rallies for the majority, uncontested party, and there were photos of Paul
Kagame (the RPF military leader who assumed the presidency of Rwanda following
the genocide) in most storefronts.
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CONCEPTUALIZING “SLUMS”
Locating “Slums” in time & space
In both policy and popular statements, informal settlements are often referred to
interchangeably as “slums.” In her exploration of the exclusivity of urban development
policies in South Africa, Marie Huchzermeyer traces the conception and consequent
erasure of slums throughout time. The term originated in early 19th century Great Britain
following rapid urbanization brought on by the Industrial Revolution (Huchzermeyer
2011:20). The etymology of slum is rooted in the word “slump,” which at the time was
commonly used to refer to marshy areas—fitting for the “slums” they referred to, which
was in “low-lying areas adjacent to canals and […] waterlogged land” (Huchzermeyer
2011:21). The word was first used to regulate the environment in 1875 with the “1875
Housing Act,” which literally designated slums as “Unhealthy Areas” (Huchzermeyer
2011:21). Laws and regulations soon followed this act that were meant to “improve” the
lives of “slum dwellers,” but generally displaced many poor urbanites. This term—and
the connotations it carries—was transcribed onto multiple regions of Africa during
British invasions and colonization. In Huchzermeyer’ discussion of this legacy of
colonialism, she states:
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“In countries marked by a strong British colonial history, postcolonial
authorities and societies have continued to apply the term to a range of
conditions that elsewhere may have been referred to as ‘informal settlements’—
unplanned residential areas with sub-standard housing, accommodating the
urban poor and often absorbing new migrants to the city. […] Most residents are
tenants, while many ‘structure owners’ are richer, politically connected, and not
residents of these ‘slums.’” [Huchzermeyer 2011:21]
The official use of the term was further proliferated with the UN-HABITAT
initiative in 1999 to “improve life for slum dwellers” as part of the Millennium
Development Goals (Huchzermeyer 2011:15). This goal was coopted to mean
eliminating slums, and the slogan “Cities Without Slums” was quickly attached to the
initiative (Huchzermeyer 2011:15-16).2 A UNHABITAT report in 2003 solidified the use
of the term “slum,” stating that it referred to:
“[any] area that combines, to various extents, the following characteristics
[…]: inadequate access to safe water; inadequate access to sanitation and
other infrastructure; poor structural quality of housing; overcrowding;
insecure residential status.” [Huchzermeyer 2011:23]
The legitimization of the term by the United Nations insinuates a singular
experience of “slum dwelling,” and has led to further dissemination in other fields.
Singularizing depictions, such as in Davis’ Planet of Slums, dangerously “allow[ing]
strangers from afar to paint monstrous pictures of huge undifferentiated neighborhoods
filled with hopeless underemployed masses” (Angotti 2006:962). In other words, the
experience of informal settlement residents in Dharavi, Mumbai is viewed as
synonymous to the experience of those in Kibera, Nairobi, even though historical
particularities and geographical differences singularize these experiences. Though every
2

UN-HABITAT did not create the slogan “Cities Without Slums.” A corollary
organization called Cities Alliance conceived the term in 1999 in a “Cities Without
Slums” campaign, but it has since been used with frequency by the UN.
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informal settlement exists in and was constructed in unique historical and environmental
conditions, the post-modern understanding of “slums” becomes urbanization gone wrong;
social evolution that should be fixed.

Construction of Policy
The unintended consequence of these homogenized constructs of informal
settlements are their actualization in the form of inaccurate policies that aim to “improve
the livelihood” of residents in informal settlements (Huchzermeyer 2011:3). “Slum
upgrading policies,” as they are commonly called, are overwhelmingly supported by
ahistorical understandings of settlements that detach specific residencies from their
temporal, geographic, and economic context (Huchzermeyer 2011:19). As a
consequence, influential monetary institutions like the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund tend to fund upgrading projects that “encourage a reductionist and
symptom-oriented approach to poverty and informality, while also unintentionally fueling
stigmatization” (Huchzermeyer 2011:39). That is, rather than taking into consideration
the built complexities of informal settlements and improving upon current conditions;
many national policies—fully legitimized by the United Nations—stipulate their
complete elimination.
Why then can informal settlements not just be torn down to build more stable
public housing? To begin with, the lack of defined, centralize infrastructure within
informal settlements necessitates a highly organized social infrastructure. In People as
Infrastructure, AbdouMaliq Simone defines this alternate infrastructure as an, “economic
collaboration among residents seemingly marginalized from and immiserated by urban
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life” (Simone 2004:407). Simone argues that the highly specialized needs present in
informal housing demands the development of equally specialized skills and problem
solving (Simone 2004:410). Returning to Huchzermeyer, informal settlements can be
understood as “incubators for inventive survival strategies where inhabitants have begun
to reclaim available space for multiple uses, develop their own specific forms of
collaboration and cooperation and reterritorialize their connections both inside and
outside the city” (Huchzermeyer 2011:43).
This idea of highly specialized, yet unseen infrastructure is echoed throughout
informal settlements in Kigali. In Agatare, many residents cited their dependence on a
network of family and friends situated in their community. These ties have been
established over continual interactions between places, people, actions and things
(Simone 2004:408). As a result, “particular spaces are linked to specific identities,
functions, lifestyles, and properties so that the spaces of the city become legible for
specific people at given places and times” (Simone 2004:409).
Though it would be incorrect to label “slum dwellers” as passive victims, many
urban development policies funded by international monetary institutions do exactly that.
Rather than recognize the complex environment, policy-makers are more likely to
“rehearse a set of politically easy choices” by conceptualizing residents as powerless
(Huchzermeyer 2011:43). Holston refers to this trend within policy- or law-making
bodies to construct constituents for their own benefit as the “formulation of citizenship”
(Holston 2008:4). He argues that policy-makers use “social differences that are not the
basis of national membership—primarily differences of education, property, race, gender,
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and occupation—to distribute different treatment to different categories or citizens”
(Holston 2008:7).
As applied to Kigali, the construction of the needs, desires, and fears of specific
categories of citizens is frequently manipulated in accordance to the Kigali Conceptual
Master Plan. For example, urban development policy frequently requires the completion
of social impact studies before construction can commence in a given area (Rwanda
Housing Authority 2014:29). The studies—which originated as World Bank regulation
“social safeguards”—are meant to identify major concerns of informal settlement
residents regarding their living conditions and risks associated with upgrading projects
(Rwanda Housing Authority 2014:29).
In analyzing the social impact study conducted by an independent German
company called GIS, Urban Planning, Engineering Surveying & Geospatial Mapping
Consultants (referred to as GISTech) was hired for the Agatare project. The concerns
highlighted by the company did not reflect concerns that residents shared during
interviews (GISTech Consultants 2015:17). The risk factors highlighted in the official
report were mostly related to hazards regarding the wetland environment. The survey
asked in a closed format to prioritize the living conditions by level of hazard, and
consequently, the survey produced results that stated that residents were most concerned
about street lighting, access to electricity, drainage, and transportation (GISTech
Consultants 2015:15-17). Conversely, when the same residents that GISTech interviewed
were provided with more flexibility to discuss concerns over construction, the
overwhelming majority was concerned about the risks associated with losing their homes
and seeking housing elsewhere. As opposed to GISTech’s one-dimensional “formulation
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of citizenship,” RISD’s interviews allowed for a wider analysis. This is reflective of the
rehearsal of politically easy choices often practiced in urban policy-formation; it is much
more difficult to conceive of and improve the livelihood of a dynamic group of people
with varying concerns, but it is much easier to provide a solution for a self-constructed
citizen.
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SPECIFIC CONDITIONS IN KIGALI, RWANDA
Geographical & Topographical Features
Located in the Central Africa region, Rwanda is bordered by the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda (Lemarchand 2012:3). It is one
of the smallest countries on the continent at 10,169 square miles, or roughly the size of
the state of Maryland. Topographically, the country is mountainous and hilly, and is aptly
nicknamed “the land of a thousand hills” (Republic of Rwanda 2014).
In the center of the country lies its capital, Kigali. At 732.24 square kilometers
and a population of approximately 1,135,430, the population is incredibly dense (Rwanda
Housing Authority 2014:33). The topography coupled with this population density means
that many urban areas are packed into very steep slopes. For governance purposes, the
city is divided into three Districts: Kicukiro, Gasabo, and Nyarugenge (RHA 2014:34).
The Districts are further divided into 35 administrative sectors, which are then split into
161 cells (RHA 2014:33). For urban planning purposes, development plans are designed
for each cell, which generally projects such as the construction of roads, installation of
streetlights, or other infrastructure (RHA 2014:57). In 2013, the population density of
Nyarugenge was recorded as 2,127 residents/km2, whereas Gasabo was 1,237/km2 and
Kicukiro 1,918/km2 (RHA 2014:37).
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Figure 3

Topographically, Kigali poses many issues to urban housing. The landscape
varies greatly, drastically changing from wetlands and marshes to steep, mountainous
areas. All three districts also have high altitudes relative to the country’s rural districts.
According to multiple government documents, the high altitude and steep grades make
much of the land in Kigali uninhabitable as it stands (RHA 2014:82). Certain grades can
allegedly lead to soil erosion, mudslides, and heavy runoff. According to an
environmental study conducted by the Rwanda Housing Authority, 6.8 percent of
Kicukiro District, 37.5 percent of Gasabo District, and 37 percent of Nyarugenge District
is uninhabitable (RHA 2014:82). This study—and others like it—is used to inform
development plans and zoning regulations. The implication is the justification of
eradicating any houses on land designated “uninhabitable.” These same areas, however,
are allocated to development projects that involve housing, making the designations seem
malleable to the needs of government projects.
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Figure 4

Trends of Urban Planning in Pre-genocidal Rwanda
One of the leading Rwandan academics in the field of urban planning, David
Niyonsenga, argues that “despite how informal[ly] it has been practiced, urban planning
in Kigali has [a] historical background” (Niyonsenga 2013:11). He traces this
background to the early 1960s, when Rwanda was occupied by the French Ministry of
Cooperation (Niyonsenga 2013:11). In 1962, Kigali’s population was about 5,500 and
was approximately three square kilometers; by 1984, the city ballooned to approximately
160,000 inhabitants and 15 square kilometers (Niyonsenga 2013:2). In an attempt to
organize the rapidly expanding city, the French MOC introduced the concept of
formalization by enforcing a Conceptual Master Plan for Kigali (Niyonsenga 2013:11).
This 1964 plan included extending the boundaries of the city, cutting the hills of
Nyarugenge to reduce the grade of slopes, constructing French ministry sites, and
delimiting affordable housing plots in Nyamirambo District (Niyonsenga 2013:11). The
first two goals were met in 1969, but the last two goals—constructing French ministry
sites and delimiting affordable housing plots in Nyamirambo—were met later and
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differently than originally planned (Niyonsenga 2013:11). MOC offices were built on
Kacyiru hill, a district that is still known for its heavy concentration of foreign
organization headquarters and “Embassy Row,” while Nyamirambo was not delineated at
all due to the proliferation of informal settlements (Niyonsenga 2013:11).
By 1975, Kigali extended beyond the geographic limits of the proposed 1964 city
limits (Niyonsenga 2013:11). The French MOC developed a 5-year development plan
that aimed to regulate informal housing and continue expanding urban infrastructure
(Niyonsenga 2013:11). With the failure of this plan, a development plan in the early
1980s aimed to delimit affordable housing in cells Nyamirambo, Gikondo, Kicukiro,
Remera, Kimihurura, and Kacyiru and construct an industrial area near the airport
(Niyonsenga 2013:11-12). This plan produced mixed results. Housing currently available
in the Kicukiro, Remera, Kimihurura, and Kacyiru Districts is very expensive, mostly
housing elite Rwandans or expatriates (Niyonsenga 2013:12).

Influences of Genocide
The period in Rwanda from 1994 to 1996 has very limited quantifiable data in
regards to urban planning and housing. This is generally associated with the chaos and
violence of the 1994 genocide, which was heavily concentrated in rural areas that had
little to no communication with central powers of government (Lemarchand 2009:90).
This pattern of violence influenced the urban development of the country over the next
decade, expanding the limits of and more heavily concentrating the population of Kigali
in a short period of time.
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Taking place over the course of ten months in 1994, the narrative associated with
the genocide is very often reduced to a story of “good and evil” (Lemarchand 2009:90).
This essentialist interpretation comes dangerously close to asserting morality as “running
parallel to ethnic lines,” pressuring scholars to introduce new lenses with which to
understand the conflict that left over 1 million Rwandans dead (Lemarchand 2009:90).
Rather than exclusively reading the narrative of ethnic and class-based
antagonism, the genocide can also be understood through the lens of land-based conflict.
As one of the smallest countries on the continent with the highest population density,
Rwanda is “often considered a perfect example of […] the unavoidable outcome of
overpopulation and environmental limitations” (Uvin 1998:82). According to materialist
scholars like Peter Uvin and Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda’s imperialist past led to decades
of smaller, land-based conflicts. After a succession of circumstantial events tied to ethnic
identity, the mounting tension finally exploded into violence. In crowded rural areas
dependent upon subsistence, land grabbing was a major motivation in killing”
(Lemarchand 2009:94). For many landless rural Rwandans, the genocide became, “a kind
of do-it-yourself land reform: an opportunity to grab land from their neighbors”
(Lemarchand 2009:94).
Niyonsenga’s studies claim that in the late 1990s, the population density and city
limits of Kigali expanded significantly (Niyonsenga 2013:11-12). Alongside this
expansion, the concentration of available formal housing stayed about the same, whereas
the concentration of informal housing expanded exponentially (Niyonsenga 2013:11).
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Figure 5

Trends of Urban Planning in Post-Genocidal Rwanda
The population of Kigali has continued to grow at a rate of 8 percent per year
(Niyonsenga 2013:12). This growth, coupled with the stability of a consistent ruling
party, provided the necessary conditions for the development of a clear housing plan. To
start, Kigali abandoned its adherence to the French MOC and its enforced development
plans (Niyonsenga 2013:12). With the intention of creating a development plan that could
be used for 50-100 years3 and account for a population growth of up to 3 million, the
Kigali Conceptual Master Plan (KCMP) was designated as the “blueprint” for all future
urban development in late 1999 (City of Kigali 2010:iii). The KCMP takes into account
all districts within the city limits and provides regulations and plans for future
development plans (CoK 2010:iii).

3

Government documents and academic reports are inconsistent with the span of the
project. Some state that the KCMP will take course over the next 50 years; other state
100 years.
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Most of the publicly disseminated information related to the KCMP stems directly
from the City of Kigali website, rather than the official documents. Here, the CoK
outlines the preexisting conditions that necessitate the KCMP, as well as a very general
explanation as to what the plan entails. According to the CoK, the KCMP is necessary to
provide a “road map” for Kigali’s future growth (CoK 2016). It guides long-term changes
in the city, gives “physical form to its strategic vision and values,” addresses proposed
projects, opens spaces, and helps city leaders and stakeholders make decisions about
planning (CoK 2016). In multiple governmental meetings I attended, the statement “it’s
not in the Master Plan,” was frequently used to block new development ideas, indicating
that the KCMP is as much about preventing specific developments as it is about guiding
new developments. The CoK website also explains that the KCMP will anticipate
changing population demographics, the need to provide services to citizens, economic
development, and create an environment that fosters business development (CoK 2016).
In a statement on the website that seems to be a direct rebuttal to the
aforementioned promotional video, “the Kigali City Master Plan is not about building
skyscrapers!” Instead, the CoK asserts, it is meant to answer the following questions
associated with positive growth: How should land be used? Where should growth occur
and in what form? Where should housing and commercial development be located? How
and where should the different building uses be located? What will be the density of the
developments?
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Projected Development of Kigali Districts
According to some4 records, the transformation of Rwanda will be especially
geared toward international tourists and businesses. Nyamirambo—a district that is
currently one of the most densely populated urban areas in the country—is projected to
become the new “sports hub” of Rwanda. Nyarugenge—another heavily populated
district—will focus upon “efficient regional and local connectivity. It will promote,
“efficient regional and local connectivity,” boasting a large bus system, “green
connectors,” restored wetlands, and “adventure tourism” like equestrian clubs. Muhima is
projected to become the new commercial hub for local and international businesses. The
Vision 2020 video envisions a grand central plaza, a generously sized shopping area,
landscape bridges, and numerous skyscrapers to comprise the new Central Business
District. The video goes on to explain the heavy presence of 5-star hotels in Kiyovu,
along with a revitalized market to replace the old Nyabugogo Market. Noticeably, none
of the districts are geared specifically toward affordable housing. This is one of the main
concerns of critics of the KCMP.
In one of the more detailed critiques of the KCMP, Ansoms and Rostagno explain
that, though the stated central goal of the plan is to build a middle-class society, “the
economic growth is concentrated in the hands of a small elite” (Ansoms and Rostagno
2012:428). The critique goes on to say that rural Rwandans—especially farmers—do not
seem to fit into the government’s idea of modern Rwanda.

4

Again, official records of different Rwandan governmental agencies frequently
contradict one another. The City of Kigali records often discuss drawing in international
visitors and tourists, where Rwandan Housing Authority tends to focus on creating
affordable housing.
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Rwandan Land Laws
According to Rwandan law, the Rwandan government “has the supreme power of
management of all land situated on the national territory” (Law 43/2013, article 3). This
is justified as all land being part of the common heritage of all Rwandan people (Law
43/2013, article 3). As the managers of the land, the Rwandan government leases plots to
Rwandan citizens and foreign entities (Law 43/2013, article 3). These lessees can in turn
lease the land for profit, but only through emphyteutic lease, which specifies that the
lessee must improve the land by construction (Law 43/2013, article 16). That is, if a
person leases a parcel of land, they are expected to build upon or farm the land in a
reasonable amount of time. All leases are made in contracts ranging from 4 to 99 years
(Law 43/2013, article 17). Any lease agreement can be ended and the land returned to the
government if the plot is considered more necessary for public use (Law 43/2013, article
12).
According to a study conducted by Rwandan Initiative for Sustainable
Development, the majority of land contracts in Kigali are four years (Binda 2012: 4).
This gives landowners very limited land tenure and a narrow sense of land security.
Though perceived as the “owners” of the land, they remain highly susceptible to
expropriation, as purposes of “public interest” in Rwanda are not specifically defined.
As secondhand lessees, tenants of informal settlements have the lowest degree of
land security. Not only is this population susceptible to governmental eviction, but they
are also vulnerable to the will of the landlord. Because Rwandan land law does not
recognize the category of informal settlement tenants, residents are offered no legal
protection from unjust eviction. This was reflected in many interviews as a general sense
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of uncertainty regarding land tenure. Many interviewees listed trivial reasons as grounds
with which to be evicted, such as: the landowner needs their house back; if they
landowner is to raise the rent and I cannot pay; if the family of the landowner wants to
live in the house; if the homeowner changes the rent agreement without informing me;
the house I am living in is sold. Furthermore, the specifics of rent agreements are not
bound by law, but instead act as an informal agreement between two people regarding
rent fees. As a result, the concept of eviction was fairly normal for most interviewed
tenants.

Development and Urban Planning Programs
To understand the context of the development plans underway, it is helpful to
consider the individual development plans and governmental and privately funded
institutions at play. As outlined above, the division of Rwanda into cells is specifically
useful for generating development plans. Along with larger goals for districts (District
Development Plans), individual cell development plans are used often.5 Individual cell
development plans must adhere to the larger District Development Plans, which in turn
must adhere to the zoning plans of the district. All development plans are technically
supposed to follow the KCMP, but as the plan is conceptual, there are no specific laws or
regulations ensuring this.
Zoning plans are used to regulate land usage, including the intensity of
development and the desired setting and height of buildings in a given area. The purpose,
then, of a zoning plan is to clearly explain what can and cannot be developed on a given
5

There are no public records of all cell development plans that I have been able to find.
There are at least cell development plans for most cells in Kigali.
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plot. The District Zoning plan for Nyarugenge includes a Zoning map and set of zoning
regulations. Whereas the map identifies zoning districts within the planning area and the
desired intensity and building height for the area, the regulations tabulate land use into
categories of permitted, conditional, and prohibited uses. Certain developments are
designated as compatible with the zoning plans (permitted use), semi-compatible with the
zoning plans, which may require certain conditions to be fulfilled (conditional use), or
non-compatible with the zoning plans as a result of safety or other concerns (prohibited
use).
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INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN RWANDA
Overview of Informal Settlements
Approximately 66 percent of Kigali’s population resides in informal housing
(Ansoms and Rostagno 2012:428). In comparison to informal settlements throughout
East Africa, living conditions on average in Kigali’s informal settlements are considered
are considered to be much better (Huggins 2010:4). For example, many informal
neighborhoods in Nairobi are characterized by open sewers, an average density of over
1,000 persons per hectare, and high crime rates (Huggins 2010:4). Informal settlements in
Kigali have virtually no open sewers, an average density of 190 persons per hectare, and
reported low crime rates (Huggins 2010: 4). In an intensive study of informal settlements
in Kigali, Huggins reports that a major opinion-survey demonstrated that between 83%
and 90% of residents in informal settlements were satisfied with their living conditions
and would not want to move (Huggins 2010:4).
In contrast to the relatively positive living conditions, one major concern
regarding informal settlements is a lack of land security. Land security is the personal
belief that there is little to no chance of being randomly, forcibly removed from your
home (Bizimana 2012:89). The lack of land security, then, is the constant fear of forced
removal. In Kigali, the lack of land security is multiplied for tenants in informal
settlements, who are allotted no protection in the legal framework. A study conducted by
the Rwanda Housing Authority found that approximately 85 percent of the residents in
informal settlements do not have land security (Rwanda Housing Authority 2014: 36).
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Aside from a general feeling of discomfort, a lack of tenure security severely
hinders residents’ attempts to improve shelter conditions or plan for long-term housing
(Bizimana 2012:87). Additionally, it often allows for the manipulation of land and
services (Bizimana 2012:87). This issue is very rarely discussed in government
documents or development plans. When land security is addressed, it is not projected as a
risk of life in informal settlements. While the main risks addressed in such documents are
mostly related to water access, electricity, drainage, and transportation, the most pressing
concern of residents as demonstrated in recent qualitative research (see Huggins 2010;
Bizimana 2012; RISD 2012) is land security. This shows a major discrepancy in the
perception of risk in informal settlements between policy-makers and residents; the risk
factors addressed in “improving the livelihood” of residents in development projects do
not aim to increase land security, but aim to improve physical conditions. Addressing
these risks is a short-term solution to the housing crisis. A long-term solution would be
taking measures to increase access to land security.

Overview of Upgrading in Rwanda
According to the Rwanda Housing Authority, informal settlement upgrading
includes improving access to basic physical and social infrastructure, economic
opportunities, tenure rights, and information and institutions while actively involving
“slum communities” during the planning, implementation, monitoring, and management
process. Specific upgrading mechanisms are dependent upon the categorization of each
informal settlement. Categories are based upon the “level of missing components” in a
given area, including: road accessibility, improved sanitation, sufficient living conditions,
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surface/storm water drainage, and durability of housing (Rwanda Housing Authority
2014:82). Depending on these components, settlements are categorized by the rubric
below:
•

Category 1A: very critical, high slope areas. Structures in this area are built on
slopes higher than 40 degrees are prone to soil erosion, have no storm water
drainage, and limited road accessibility. Immediate relocation is suggested.

•

Category 1B: very critical, wetlands. These areas are prone to shift during heavy
rains, have poor sanitation, and lack of sufficient living conditions. Immediate
relocation is suggested.

•

Category 2: missing most components. Residents are in immediate or at high risk
of danger as a result of the lack of most components and little access to
emergency relief. RHA states that most informal settlements in Kigali are
category 2. Immediate relocation is suggested.

•

Category 3: mainly missing access roads and durable housing. This category
requires certain upgrades, but does not require immediate relocation.

•

Category 4: mainly missing access roads. This category requires certain upgrades,
but does not require immediate relocation.

•

Category 5: mainly missing durable housing. This category requires certain
upgrades, but does not require immediate relocation.

•

Category 6: average condition in all attributes. This category requires certain
upgrades, but does not require immediate relocation.
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Additional sub-categories include “high risk slope informal settlements (IS),” “flood
risk IS,” “worst IS,” “poor IS,” and, “moderate IS.”

Figure 6

Specific approaches to informal settlement upgrading fall into the broader
categories of provider or support model (RHA 2014:108). The provider model dictates
the provision of infrastructure and new housing for informal settlement residents,
whereas the support model dictates the provision of basic infrastructure and the
assumption that residents are able to build new housing for themselves (RHA 2014:110).
The following are upgrading strategies within each model:
Provider Model strategies
•

Green field: an undeveloped area is provided with basic plots and housing where
informal settlement residents are relocated to.

•

Roll-over approach: current housing in an area is demolished; new housing and
infrastructure is developed in its place.
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•

Infill development: Redeveloping an “underutilized” space to create new housing.

•

Public social housing: government-funded housing is provided.

Support Model strategies
•

In situ upgrading: upgrading infrastructure and service availabilities, rather than
housing, with the least amount of expropriation possible.

•

Core housing: provision of the minimum structure of a house that still needs some
construction by residents in a new location.

•

Site and services: residents are given a plot and basic infrastructure in a new
location.

•

Incremental housing: incremental loans are distributed to residents for the gradual
construction of a house in a new location.

Though the RHA report extensively discusses the support model, there are no current
development plans in place that implement any of the strategies. The strategy used most
frequently in upgrading projects is roll-over.

World Bank Involvement
As the “second fastest developing country” in the world, Rwanda successfully
applied for eight World Bank project loans in 160 different locations for $556.4 million
USD in 2015 (World Bank 2017). For any project funded fully or partially by the World
Bank, extensive social and environmental impact studies known as Strategic
Environmental and Social Assessments (SESA) are required to approve construction
(World Bank 2017).
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As explicated above, the German company GISTech was hired by the City of
Kigali to complete the social impact report. GISTech released the Capital Improvement
Plan report in May 2014. Below is the entirety of the data collected by GISTech related
to building materials and specific quality of housing:
“Various materials are used in construction in the area. According to RHPC
2012 96% of the population in Nyarugenge use Iron sheet for roofing. This is
confirmed by our field survey which showed that over 97% use iron sheet for
roofing. For walls most of the households used earth and wood. The survey
shows that the floors are mostly constructed with concrete and finished with
cement screed. On the lower scale, some of the houses with mud walls also have
mud floors. In few instances, some houses are finished with ceramic or granite
tiles.” [GISTech 2015:34-35]
This data—coupled with the fact that publicly available GISTech documents do not
include research methodology—is indicative of a shallow understanding of the lived
experience in Agatare. This information, however, provided the entirety of the data for
the social safeguard study.

Nyarugenge Development Project Details
After its categorization as a priority-upgrading site in 2014, the Agatare cell was
placed on a fast track for the recipient of upgrading projects (Rwanda Housing Authority
2014:92). In the same year, the Nyarugenge Upgrading Project was proposed by the City
of Kigali (City of Kigali 2014:1). Using the regulations and plans within Nyarugenge’s
District Development Plan (DDP), the project was designed by the City of Kigali,
Rwanda Housing Authority, and Nyarugenge District (City of Kigali 2014). It was
designed as two phases: Phase 1, to be internally funded, would act as a “pilot” program
for Phase 2, a much larger project to be funded by the World Bank. The majority of the
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information below is taken directly from personal minutes taken at meetings held with
the City of Kigali, World Bank, RISD, and Rwanda Housing Authority.

Figure 7

Figure 8

Phase 1, funded by various ministries in the GoR, mandates the construction of a
400-meter long, 6-meter wide road connecting the Biryogo market to Rwampara road. If
this project passes the World Bank Involuntary Resettlement Policy safeguard, the World
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Bank agrees to fund the second phase. Phase 2 plans to upgrade 86 hectares of land in
Nyarugenge, most likely by use of roll-over methods.

Figure 9

The road will be used mainly for the passing of emergency vehicles (e.g.,
ambulances, police vehicles, etc.), motorbikes, and pedestrians. It will be constructed
with tarmac and will be 16 meters wide and 500 meters long. Construction is set to begin
3 months after the valuation process is completed, estimated to be October or November
2016. The current road construction plan will directly impact 29 structures, many of
which contain multiple households.
Though no specific details have been publically released for Phase 2, the World
Bank is set to fund the project at $10 million USD for the installment of basic
infrastructure as prioritized in the GISTech report. According to the Master Plan Report
of Nyarugenge, the main objectives of infrastructure proposed for the Nyarugenge
District are: providing an effective water management system, providing an effective
waste management system, and providing an adequate energy management system.
Meetings have implied that upgrading provisions will fit the provider model, but Vision
2020 stipulates roll-over of the 86-hectare area. To place this in perspective, 84.3% of the
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residents of Nyarugenge live within the 86-hectare area, making this area’s population
density 4.5 times higher than the remainder of the district.

Upgrading Case Study: Batsinda
The following case study is very similar in geographic and socio-economic
conditions to the Agatare Cell. I included the study as an example of the full timeline of
upgrading projects, beginning with conceptual development plans all the way to
consequences following eradication. This provides a more expansive view of Rwandan
urban development with which to situate the Agatare project, as my research ends just
before eradication. Due to the numerous parallels between the two projects—including
those drawn by many interviewees in Agatare—the consequences of Batsinda can be
postulated as possible consequences for Agatare.
The vision of this upgrading project began with the implementation of the 2007
Expropriation Law and the finalization of the Kigali Master Plan and involved the
displacement of residents in the Ubumwe cell in lower Kiyovu District (Huggins 2010:
5). Though Ubumwe was comprised mostly of informal settlements, the Kigali City
Master Plan envisioned the area as a neighborhood of high-end, houses that will
“decentralize key business and recreational activities and minimize road congestion”
(Rosen 2015).
Between 2007 and 2008, 362 plots were eradicated for the housing project
(Huggins 2010:4). This word choice provides one of the more significant parallels
between Batsinda and Agatare. Although “plot” refers to a section of land that can
contain between one and seven homes, most literature surrounding the project stated that
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362 houses were destroyed (Huggins 2010:5). This word choice may not seem overly
significant, but it implies that 362 families were displaced, when in actuality, thousands
of families were displaced. Similarly, in Agatare, RISD was told originally that the road
would impact 29 houses. When RISD began work on the ground, they found that 29 plots
would be affected, but within those plots were 43 houses. Furthermore, many houses
contained multiple families. This use of terminology can manipulate the public
perception of the impact a project will have.
Landowners were given the choice of accepting the government’s monetary
compensation or resettling in a new residence at the city limits (Huggins 2010:5). The
housing project was originally undertaken by GIZ and Engineers without Borders, but
has since been taken over by the Rwandan Social Security Board (Huggins 2010:5). 126
households elected to live in the newly constructed village, whereas the remaining
households chose compensation.6
Although a social impact study indicated that the majority of affected households
in Ubumwe were living in poverty (household average monthly income fell below 30,000
Rwandan francs), the most affordable unit in the newly constructed Vision City was a
two-bedroom apartment that costs 124 million Rwandan francs (Huggins 2010:5). To
further contextualize these statistics, most homeowners expropriated in Batsinda were
given under 1 million Rwandan francs. Following the construction, a research study
indicated that only 20 percent of relocated households were able to secure equal or higher
quality housing (Rosen 2015). According to Tomá Berlanda, “authorities’ insistence on a

6

Though there is no exhaustive research on the subject, it appears that the majority of
displaced residents in a given settlement opt for full monetary compensation rather than
resettlement.
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top-down push toward formal housing risks causing unnecessary hardship for the city’slower income residents while increasingly excluding them from much of the urban
fabric” (Rosen 2015).
The issues that Huggins recorded during the study mirror the anecdotes that
interviewees shared. To begin with, many compensated residents felt that their houses
and plots were under-valuated by the Kigali City Council (KCC). After mobilizing to
seek independent valuation of their residences, residents found that independent estimates
were far higher than the values given by the KCC. Though the Expropriation law ensures
that residents are given 90 days notice prior to demolition, all houses were demolished in
July 2008 without due notice (Huggins 2010:5). Furthermore, in March of 2009, many
residents had not yet been compensated. This experience was referenced in the fears of
multiple interviewees in Agatare. One interviewee explained their concern that, “in
Muhima, some residents were not given compensation in due time and it took a long time
to get it.” Many residents who chose not to move to the government housing in Batsinda,
therefore, were forced to live in low-quality housing, similar to the area that was
demolished for purposes of development.
Those residents that moved to Batsinda, on the other hand, had separate
complaints. Huggins found through interviews that the Imidugudu was located too far
away from Kigali, resulting in loss of employment or much higher costs of transportation.
Additionally, the types of housing present in Muhima were not accounted for (e.g.,
additional bedrooms, multi-story housing, etc.). Instead, only one type of house was built
in Batsinda, a “simple design with two bedrooms and one living room [and] an external
shower cubicle and toilet. This design, while ignoring the socio-economic surveys
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conducted prior to construction, compromised many cultural Rwandan values, such as
keeping male and female children in separate rooms (Huggins 2010:5).
The overall negative experiences that many interviewees shared with Huggins
was overwhelming. The Rwandan media, however, reported it as “a success story which
meets international standards” (Huggins 2010:6). UNHABITAT bestowed the Rwandan
government with a Scroll of Honor award for the project. These reports cited information
such as newly settled residents in Batsinda receiving access to water and other basic
services. The information regarding Batsinda was incomplete and partly incorrect, as
Huggins explained that many residents still have not gotten piped water, providing even
less access to clean water than their previous living situation. The reports failed entirely
to follow up with those residents who chose not to relocate to Batsinda. Huggins
explained their situation:
“Those who were unwilling or unable to live in Batsinda, and have
relocated to another area of their own choice, may be living in similar or
worse conditions to those originally found in Ubumwe. Compensation
packages are reportedly low, and do not include the costs associated with
relocation. The financing package offered by the Rwanda Housing Bank is
unaffordable for many. Some former Ubumwe residents are therefore
likely to be living in worse conditions than previously.” [Huggins 2010:6]
Though the negative experiences during the Batsinda project were recorded years
prior to the design of the Nyarugenge Upgrading project, many aspects are designed
nearly identically. The sensitization and resettlement options for displaced residents
remained unsatisfactory; the magnitude of displacement was again not made clear; and
the implementation remained heavily top-down. This continual pattern of ineffective
development projects is arguably fueled by the constant praise of Rwandan development
on international levels. In addition to UNHABITAT, other institutions like the World
Bank, foreign governments, and journalists worldwide have promoted Rwandan
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development as a rare success story (see National Public Radio 2012; World Bank 2017;
United Nations 2014). These narratives are widely framed as an inspirational story of
overcoming the atrocities of the genocide; yet the counter-narrative of large-scale
displacement alongside such “success stories” is rarely present.
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DATA ANALYSIS
Taking into consideration the information presented thus far, the harmful, often
unintended consequences of urban development programs in Kigali are clear. Revisiting
the original research question of this paper, why then are these upgrading structures still
in place? Why are residents of informal settlements continually displaced?
In alignment to these questions, the goal of this research is to more fully
understand the experience of informal settlement residents in reference to how policymakers perceive their experience. More specifically, through the cross-analysis of
residential interviews in Agatare and the interviews conducted with various levels of
policy-makers, the remaining research intends to identify the most glaring discrepancies
in terms of perceptions of informal settlements, locating the discrepancies in
anthropological theory with the above background information.

Background of RISD
Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development is a civil-society organization
based in Kigali that focuses on research-based advocacy in Kigali, Rwanda. Founded in
1994 to assist with land disputes that were not taken to court, RISD’s work has recently
centered on sensitizing vulnerable communities to their land rights, advocating for
vulnerable individuals in court and settling disputes outside of court.7

7

For more detailed examples of RISD’s previous work, see risdrwanda.org
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The RISD website lists its mission as: to contribute to sustainable development
for women and men especially the vulnerable through equitable access and use of land;
by means of action research, networking and empowerment of the grassroots. RISD also
publishes research studies on issues related to their mission annually.
RISD’s role in the Nyarugenge Upgrading Project has been unclear as a result of
inconsistent requests from the CoK and RHA. Originally, RISD entered into a binding
Memorandum of Understanding with the CoK and the World Bank. RISD was expected
to conduct a detailed social impact report in Agatare to determine the social
consequences of the road construction. A separate CSO was set to conduct an
environmental impact study. Without prior warning, RISD attended a meeting at the CoK
offices where they were told that the social impact study had already been conducted by a
German organization called GISTech and that their services were no longer required.
Despite this information, RISD carried out the social impact study as originally planned
as a result of concerns regarding potential land rights abuses.
From June-August 2015, I regularly traveled to the field site with RISD’s research
team to conduct preliminary field visit reports, attend community meetings, and conduct
interviews. RISD is currently working to publish their findings in the format of a research
paper in Kinyarwanda.

Interview Process
The interview guide used for residents8 was designed with the research team at
RISD. Taking into account RISD’s local knowledge on the area, the guide was written

8

Full copy of the interview guide in Appendix A
47

with the following questions in mind: What information do you have about the
construction of this road? How do you get this information? What are your fears related
to this project? What are your hopes related to this project? The guide was then organized
into the following sections:
1. Biographical information (e.g., range of income, number of individuals in a given
household, age ranges)
2. Land rights (e.g., tenant status, communication with landlord, knowledge of land
rights)
3. Awareness and communication (e.g., number of informational meetings attended,
known details of construction, where to access more information about the
projects)
4. Potential consequences (e.g., projected issues with road construction, relocation
details, benefits or setbacks to the road construction)
5. Understanding expropriation (e.g., knowledge of expropriation process,
expectations for compensation, past experiences with displacement)
6. Dispute Management (e.g., projected conflicts at the familial, neighborhood,
district, and city level)
The interview guide used for local experts9 was designed to determine the accuracy of the
individual’s information regarding the project, the level of communication they had with
residents, and their experience with policy-making and expropriation. The guide was
organized into the following sections:

9

Full copy of the interview guide in Appendix B
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1. Biographical information (e.g., what level of government individual is employed
with, work location, home location)
2. Understanding of Development Projects (e.g., knowledge on the Agatare project,
knowledge on Kigali development projects at large)
3. Role in Planning Projects (e.g., role in construction, role in communicating with
residents)
4. Communication with Superiors/Community Members (e.g., line of
communication from interviewee to superiors or employees, type of information
shared)
5. Landowners’ and Tenants’ Right (e.g., knowledge and accuracy of the rights of
landowners and tenants in situations of displacement)

Research Methods
The data was collected through a series of structured interviews that took place on
site through the assistance of a team of four enumerators.10 Each household11 that was to
be destroyed as noted by the Nyarugenge Development Plan was interviewed according
to head of household.12 The interviews were then translated from Kinyarwanda to English
by the staff of RISD. Local “experts” were identified by RHA and RISD, which included
individuals at each level of the project (cell level, district level, etc.). The four
government employees interviewed from lowest to highest ranking were: Village
10

I used a direct translator for the interviews I personally conducted.
Some structures contained anywhere from 2-5 households inside. Though all buildings
were one story, those buildings that contained multiple households were set up as
apartments with some communal spaces.
12
Resident questionnaire is in Appendix A; local expert/policy-maker questionnaire is in
Appendix B.
11
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Security Officer of Agatare; Social, Economic, and Development Officer of Agatare;
District Urban Planner; and Head Architect of Vision 2020.
Additional information was gathered through phone calls, email correspondence,
and minutes from various meetings regarding the road project.

Analysis Methods
I analyzed the qualitative sections of interviews using the strategies of grounded
theory as explained in Analyzing Qualitative Data: The Systemic Approach. This theory
uses a set of techniques to induce meaning from “people’s own words,” which was in this
case the interviews conducted with residents (Amber 2017:541). The parameter for the
selected interviews was dictated by the road construction plan; all 43 interviewees lived
in houses that would be razed. After reading these interviews, I employed inductive
coding. This coding technique involves defining “codes” that can be used as a key to
understanding the data. Each code should include: specificities for inclusion or exclusion,
particular meanings to being “in” or “out” of the code, and values possible within the
code such as high/medium/low (Amber 2017:543).
Once codes are selected after initial readings of the interviews, a “codebook” is
made to keep track of how many interviews demonstrate belonging to the code. For
example, one possible “code” in this set of interviews was the concern of tenants over fair
compensation. For every tenant interview that expressed a concern over fair
compensation, I marked the appearance of the code in the codebook. 18-50 appearances
of a code signify that the code is a pattern in the data and can be considered a relevant
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theory. Using analytic induction, this process makes the use of a formal method to “build
up causal explanations of phenomena from a small number of cases” (Amber 2017:545).
The codes determined as “causal explanations” are not exhaustive. Through the
process of coding all 43 resident interviews, I determined the following six themes:
significance of place, concerns over compensation, lack of land security, monopolization
of information, and safety concerns.
I analyzed the quantitative sections of the interviews using the SPSS Statistics
program. After selecting the relevant categories and running the programming, I exported
the files into Microsoft Excel to create readable charts. This data was used to provide a
richer description of the population of Agatare, including demographic information. All
charts are visible following the emergent themes.

Field Visit
The initial field visit took place during a preliminary community meeting held
between RISD and concerned residents in Agatare.
Agatare is unique in that it is a decidedly informal area surrounded by formality.
To the north is the historic13 Biryogo market recently “upgraded” with paved sidewalks
and organized vendor booths by the government. A path leading downhill from the
market unexpectedly gives way to a stone path, which quickly becomes the wide, worn
dirt path that runs through Agatare. This main path forks into narrower side streets,
leading from house to house. The effects of the non-permeable surfaces north of this
13

Research does not indicate the exact date that Biryogo was constructed, but local
information points to it being one of the oldest markets in Kigali. Though Nyabugogo is
nearly irrefutably the oldest market in the city, it has been almost entirely renovated and
is not recognizable from 25 years in the past.
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housing are immediately noticeable; many residents explain that after the upgrading in
Biryogo, the water that used to be retained at the high elevation (but now flowed right off
the concrete) had nowhere to go but their own plots. The widest dirt path has severely
eroded; created a lightning-shaped crack in the ground that rainwater makes deeper and
wider every day.
The dirt path cuts off unexpectedly at the newly constructed, two-lane, concrete
road. It appears out of place because it drives directly through what used to be a
continuous neighborhood. It has been the source of numerous complaints for similar
reasons to the Biryogo market’s upgrading—the runoff from the non-permeable surface
has destroyed multiple houses and caused similar erosion in pathways.
These two concrete strips of formality leaves a large neighborhood in the center
of Agatare. In RHA publications, both upgrading projects—as well as the pending new
road project—were justified as making the area easier to drive though for residents. “Not
many people in Agatare have cars. Probably something like 5 percent” a RISD coworker
who lived nearby explained to me during a walkthrough. Many residents echoed this
opinion in interviews; none of the 43 households even owned vehicles.
The houses in the remaining informal neighborhood are constructed with a litany
of materials. Most are a combination of bricks and a stucco-like exterior composed of
mud bricks and a concrete coating. Many of the houses cannot be viewed from the main
street as a result of the placement of tall, hand-constructed fences, as is custom for many
informal houses in Kigali to install. These fences are generally wooden planks nailed
together haphazardly or large metal sheets hammered into the ground, with the exception
of well-off residents who may have a brick or concrete wall dividing their property.
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Many residents (especially tenants) expressed that they would not spend the time or
money to construct a high-quality fence because of the lack of land security. If a family
were renting a 3-bedroom house and could be evicted or expropriated at a month’s notice,
why spend money on a brick wall? The fences were also used more for the sake of
privacy (many residents washed clothes, spent time, or did other private things in the lot
immediately in front of their building) rather than for the sake of security.

Emergent Themes
Significance of place:
One of the most noticeable themes was the significance of place and the meaning
that residents ascribed to the neighborhood. There was a notable discrepancy between
how the residents and the policy-makers conceptualized the neighborhood. Drawing from
the earlier analysis of Simone’s “people as infrastructure,” meaning is continually created
through the everyday exchanges that neighbors had with one another and their
environment. One interviewee explained, “I cannot go far from my place of birth. It’s
where my friends, people, and even my clients live, and it’s not easy to find other clients
and friends.” This interviewee constructed space through association to a social and
professional network.
Residents’ concerns over the potential loss of place was reflected in their
responses to questions such as, “how will you decide where to move?” Many
interviewees described finding a place very similar to or remaining in Agatare. Said one,
“living conditions in Biryogo are so easy and it’s near my job.” Many other interviewees
echoed the concern of remaining close to their work, which is likely based upon the
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centrality to other cells. Others noted that their relatives were near the area. Some noted
the closeness to their child’s school. The complexity of this invisible infrastructure can be
further understood through statement from Simone:
“Such infrastructure remains largely invisible unless we reconceptualize the
notion of belonging in terms other than those of a logic of group or territorial
representation. People as infrastructure indicates residents’ needs to generate
concrete acts and contexts of social collaboration inscribed with multiple
identities rather than in overseeing and enforcing modulated transactions among
discrete population groups.” [Simone 2004:419]
Many tenants also put a significant amount of labor and funding into their rented
homes to establish a sense of place. As Burnet discusses in Genocide Lives in Us, the
cultural norm of Rwandans—especially in crowded urban areas—is the desire for
privacy. Privacy is not mutually exclusive to the sharing of information and construction
of social networks, but is achieved in different means. Almost all houses were hidden by
fences, usually constructed out of sheet metal. These fences acted as symbolic and literal
“gates” to a household’s privacy.
The metal sheets are not attractive—they are sometimes jagged, rusty, uneven, or
mismatched. This is a stark contrast to the careful maintenance of the land on the other
side of the fence. Many interviewed tenants meticulously swept their plots to maintain a
tidy lawn. Although the area is dusty, this care taken to keep tidy demonstrates a degree
of pride not usually indicated in much literature about informal settlements. Instead, as
seen in GISTech’s publication, informal settlements are often described as unlivable
urban squalor. Take for example Davis’ characterization of informal settlements as
“embryonic megalopolis[es],” “tragic,” “amoeba[s],” and as “peasant flood[s]” (Davis
2006:4). As discussed in the prior section about informality, this imagery is common—it
is often used to guilt the “first world” into donating money or thinking about
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globalization. But every informal settlement is quite different—even from house to
house.
There are many different ways that a informal settlement resident may put effort
into their home while realizing that they could be evicted with little to no notice. The
choice to use poorly constructed fences, for example, could be read from an outsider’s
standpoint as careless or lazy. GISTech’s survey inferred that many residents had no real
connection to their plot or home because of the visibility of metal sheets. Inside the
home, however, is often painstakingly cared for. Many interviewed residents
meticulously swept leaves, hair, or even uneven piles of dust from their front plots.
Interiors were kept neat. Below, the photos used by GISTech to characterize living
conditions in Agatare are very different from the conditions that were evident to RISD on
field visits.

Figure 10
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Figure 11

Figure 12

The significance of place can be further understood through its importance in
marginalized spaces worldwide. In Landscape of Hope and Despair, Peteet describes at
length the means with which Palestinian refugees continually construct and reconstruct
Palestinian identity through physical space. Though certainly not refugees, informal
settlement residents face incredibly tenuous situations in which they have little to no
agency over their movement or land security. Rather than ownership of space in each
scenario holding importance, however, the significance of place becomes much more
meaningful. As Peteet explains, the production of place regularly occurs through
patterned activities and social relationships and the given “cultural rules” affecting them.
Although the RHA can provide new homes for informal settlement residents, the
removal of individuals from a sense of place means tearing at the social fabric that has
been built since the settlement’s origins. Peteet describes Palestinian identity as being
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built upon a sense of belonging to a specific social group. These social groups were
physically bound—in this case, to specific refugee camps—and in turn, were transformed
by physical boundaries. The relationship between place and identity, then, interact with
power that “limits as well as shapes possibilities” for both.

Concerns about compensation:
One of the underlying concerns of all interviewees was the need for
compensation, or rather, fear of the lack of compensation. These concerns were rooted in
past personal experiences, the experiences of friends, family, or neighbors, or from
general hearsay. These concerns were also divided into landowning individuals.14 One
such project noted with frequency was the Ubumwe cell in Muhima, located in the lower
Kiyovu area of Kigali. Though interviewees mostly vaguely alluded to the disastrous
results of the project, Chris Huggins conducted a detailed study while the expropriation
occurred.
The average request of compensation from tenants was 125,000 Rwandan Francs
(RWF). According to the Director General of the Rwandan Housing Authority, tenants
would not be compensated. Specifically in the case of the Rwampara Road, which is
precedent-setting in terms of future expropriation15, multiple meetings asserted that
tenants would not be given any monetary compensation. The logic behind this decision
was that tenants do not own the property, thus, if the landowners were given enough

14

Though technically all interviewees are lessees of the government, those individuals
who rented their land directly from the government considered themselves landowners.
Those individuals who rented land from a third party (e.g., those who rent land from the
government directly) considered themselves tenants.
15
According to an interview with the Head Architect of Vision 2020.
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warning, the tenants would not need any compensation and could simply stop renting the
house. According to interviews with tenants, however, compensation is necessary for
needs such as: hired help for lifting furniture, taxi fare to move furniture and other
belongings, transportation for household members, and money for a down payment on a
new rental location. Many tenants explained that renting a new house requires a down
payment of three months or more worth of rent. This cost exceeds the limit of what many
renting households are capable of paying, which means that compensation from the
government is expected.

Land Security
One of the issues that many residents faced and accepted as a natural way of
urban life was the extreme tenuousness of land security. Tenants were often shuffled
from home to home at the whim of a landowner. A significant amount of tenants stated a
reasonable reason to be asked to leave their rent agreement was that “the landowner
needed the home.” This constant sense of unease about the security of their living
environment contributed to the responses of the road project. Many tenants were
expectant that they would be removed from their homes at some point, like the memory
and reactivation of a trauma. Many tenants had experienced displacement recently. One
resident had even been displaced from Muhima recently, and her house was again going
to be destroyed for the good of the country.
The significance of this theme was the assurance of RHA reports that informal
settlement upgrading was meant to increase the security of the most vulnerable
populations in Rwandan society by helping to “lift” them out of poverty. The upgrading
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is having the opposite effect, and is solidifying the idea that tenants are expendable and
can live anywhere rather than being dependent on a single area for employment and
social needs.

Monopolization of Information:
One way that the power dynamic between government officials, landowners, and
tenants was maintained and reproduced was the uneven balance of accurate information.
The more power that an actor could wield over the road project was directly
proportionate to their knowledge—not only of the specific road project, but of other
development plans across the country. For example, I spoke to the head architect of the
road-upgrading project for over an hour. During this time, she spoke at length about the
future of the city’s development with confidence, beginning before the approval of the
KCMP. She knew facts regarding the financial actors at play in development projects
throughout the city, the specific aesthetic details of future projects, and the ins and outs of
land laws. This architect was likely one of the most powerful actors in Kigali in terms of
changes to the upgrading plan.
In stark contrast, some interviewed residents had such inaccurate or little
information about the road project that they didn’t seem to be discussing the same project
as the architect. The size of the road varied from interview to interview; some thought
that the road would be a footpath whereas others thought it would be a two-lane road.
Similarly, the material of the road varied from interviewee to interviewee. Some were
certain that the road was to be made of tarmac, whereas others said it would be assorted
stones.
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This monopolization of information was tied to the dissemination of information.
The spread of accurate information stemmed from multiple “community meetings” that
CoK officials organized. These took place during the day and were not well advertised.
One tenant explained that he could not go to any of the four meetings (there were actually
only three according to District officials) because he had to work from early in the
morning to late at night. District officials claimed that they tried to compensate for this by
having meetings at different times, but many tenants expressed that they had no choice
but to work long hours and couldn’t take breaks. This lack of attendance meant that most
information regarding the project came from hearsay, which did not come from any one
identifiable source. Other tenants were unaware that there were meetings at all. Some
tenants thought that this was funded entirely by the World Bank, one interviewee even
asserted that Bill Gates’ organization was funding it. Two tenants did not know that the
road would affect their living spaces until the interview.
Homeowners, on the other hand, had somewhat more accurate information. All
homeowners knew that a road was being built and that their house was going to be razed.
Most were also concerned, however, about the structure and information of these
informational meetings. Meetings were not organized to allow for questions and did not
allow suggestions for alterations from the homeowners. One stated, “During community
meetings, local leaders should listen to the needs, views and concerns of the residents
instead of coming and just inform them that you will be given such an amount of
money.”
These findings indicated the association of knowledge with power in development
projects, or rather perhaps, the access to knowledge with the show of power.
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Civic Duty associated with Development:
Although most of the interviewees were aware that the imminent construction
would mean the destruction of their homes and their own displacement, many also
demonstrated a genuine belief in the benefits of the project and urban development at
large. Many of these positive responses expressed national pride and a sense of sacrifice
for the common good. One interviewee explained that expropriation was “an activity
carried out by the government for the majority of the people.” Another understood the
process as “an action that brings benefits to many and others lose, especially the
displaced ones.” This general portrait of expropriation reflected the idea that, even though
they would obviously not benefit from it, the road project should be accepted. The idea of
supporting the larger goals of the country further illustrated by one resident who, when
asked why they supported the road project, replied: “Because it’s a government plan that
will benefit the majority of residents, you should accept it happily.”
In further support of the road project, many residents (especially tenants)
rationalized the need for the road to “clean up” the area. Interviewees described Agatare
as “dirty,” “dusty,” even, “not very good.” These characterizations of the area
contradicted the overwhelming responses of enjoying the “easy life” in Agatare as a
result of its proximity to employment opportunities, easy transportation, education, and
other factors explicated in the above section. The common denominator of the negative
factors was aestheticism. More specifically, many interviewees demonstrated a concern
that their area was too discrepantly different from the surrounding areas, which made the
government want to clean it. For the purpose of the road, interviewees stated things like it
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would “change the appearance of this area,” “make Kigali city clean,” “improve
sanitation and cleanliness,” and “make people build good houses because of the good
road.” A few others hinted at developmentalism; one resident justified the construction
as, “government […] wanting to modernize housing in this area.”
At its core, the general civic duty reproduced in most interviews was enduring
displacement for the benefit of future Rwandans. Of course, the secondary unspoken
assumption was that Rwandans in similar social positions would benefit from their
sacrifice and would have improved living conditions as a result of development. Many of
the interviewees seemed to stress their responsibility as citizens in order to reconcile their
displacement and sense of loss. This was a fair assumption judging by the rhetoric
employed by many policy-makers involved in the project. The language used in
community informational meetings reflected a desire to improve living conditions in the
area, most specifically transportation and drainage issues related to the informal road in
place. Interviews with local policy-makers mirrored this rhetoric, as many focused on the
improvement of residents and the current poor conditions of the area in their interviews.
Reasoning for the construction was often backed with statistics about the living
conditions in the area, which were exclusively described very negatively. Of course, the
improvement of livelihood is a moot point, as the entire area will be flattened for Phase II
of the upgrading project, displacing all residents that the interviewees were making a
sacrifice for and that policy-makers used to justify displacement in the first place.
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Safety Concerns:
Many residents cited the increased risk of injury and crime with the construction
of the road. Said one interviewee, “accidents will be many—it will take children—
because it is a stopping place amongst many families.” Another interviewee expressed a
similar concern: “There will be fears about the security of the children that live near the
road.” Many similar statements to this seemed to revolve around the unfamiliarity with
the road—specifically children. Many of the children, according to residents, have never
lived elsewhere and aren’t used to busy roads or cars. Many parents seemed to worry that
their children would run out into the road that would be constructed so closely to the
remaining homes.
Other safety concerns revolved around the increased foot traffic in the area and
the potential for robberies or other crimes. Many interviewees first asserted that the area
was generally very safe, but that the road would attract cars and pedestrians from outside
the area. Said one interviewee, “there will be too many passengers which may contribute
to the increase of theft.” These concerns can also be tied back to the sense of place, as the
general tone was a distrust of the unknown. That is, many safety concerns were not tied
to insiders from the community acting out in crime, but to strangers entering the familiar
place.
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SPSS Analysis

Table 1: How old are you?

Table 2: What is your household average monthly income?
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Table 3: When was this project first introduced to you?

Table 4: How much time would you propose for relocation?

Table 5: Are you a landowner or a tenant?
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Table 6: Do you feel that you have enough information on this project?

Table 7: How long have you and/or your family lived in this
neighborhood?

Table 8: Have you had any other experience with
expropriation?
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Conclusive Analysis of Data
Considering this extensive compilation of data repeatedly pointing to the
harms and ineffectiveness of urban development policy as it stands, why do these
development mechanisms and plans remain in extensive use? As hypothesized,
there are many levels of significant discrepancies between the lived experiences of
informal settlement residents as illustrated in interviews and their perceived
experiences illustrated by policy-makers. These discrepancies are likely a major
factor in the continual irrelevancy of upgrading programs to affected residents.
These discrepancies are far from the only factor influencing urban upgrading. The
rhetoric surrounding the militant nationalism pervasive in most aspects of Rwandan
society is often used to justify exclusion and displacement. Furthermore, this
rhetoric pervades many residents’ acceptance of their own displacement, as it is
considered “part of the greater good.” The data also alludes to an underlying
capitalist structure inherent in many urban exclusionary practices that acts to
reconcile mass displacement as a natural course of increased productivity.
One of the more notable discrepancies was regarding the perceived value of
informal settlements. This discrepancy came up in the codes “significance of place”
and “concerns of compensation.” Oftentimes, the amount of physical and emotional
labor that tenants put into their houses was entirely overlooked by policy-makers.
For example, the tediously formed earth floors in many settlements were simply
listed as “mud floors” in the GIZ study. In one interview, a tenant explained that
earth floors were improved upon in most houses in the area by a labor-intensive
process of wetting the earth, multiple people beating it down with sturdy brooms,
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and repeating the process until a concrete-like, non-permeable surface was created.
This indicated a serious lapse in the perception of place between policy-makers and
interviewees. Although most households spent hours creating a more livable space
by constructing fencing, improving the floors, and building expansions, this
experience was brushed aside as simply surviving in a setting of squalor.
This research is part of a growing collection of knowledge on the patterns of
informal settlement eradication and displacement, confirming wider findings and
adding a unique case study to this important literature. Most notably, the results are
reflective of Huchzermeyer’s findings during her ethnographic research in South
Africa on the patterns of informal settlement eradication. It also has many parallels
to Huggins’ work on urban housing policies in East and Central Africa. One of
Huggins’ concluding statements regarding the Muhima upgrading project in Kigali
can in fact be directly applied to the collected data from Agatare. Said Huggins
about the project:
“Rather than environmental health concerns, an undefined idea of
‘modernisation’ seems to be a prime motivation for the demolition of
informal settlements. Aesthetic concerns about the image of the city –
particularly tidiness and the use of ‘modern’ building materials –
dominate.” [Huggins 2010:6]
Much literature surrounding informal settlement eradication makes note of
something similar to Huggins’ statement. The modernizing of urban areas does not
generally take into consideration health concerns, but is mostly concerned with
aesthetics. The concern with aesthetics can be drawn once again to that great
equalizer: global capitalism. Taking into account the previous discussion of
nationalism and social evolutionary developmentalism, the increased productivity
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of a given space in a “developing country” will prove beneficial to the powerful
few.
The current orientation of the “development industry,” as Ferguson calls it, is
rooted in the capitalist beliefs of the values of productivity. Applied to urban
development, this “industry” assumes that “diverting such resources from ‘inefficient’
use toward more value-producing outcomes with the belief that greater production will
increase consumption and well-being at all levels of society” (Oliver-Smith 2010:16).
That is, since the value system attached to capitalism places productivity above all else, a
capitalistic nation-state will likely continue to prioritize the commoditization of informal
settlements over the improvement of living conditions. If an area can be capitalized upon
through formalization, it likely will be. This is not because of the helplessness of the
residents, nor the indifference of the government; it is because of the oppression inherent
in capitalistic globalization.
Development policies must be held accountable from more than a strictly
economic basis; rather than assuming all societal levels will reap the benefits of
modernization, representation must be built into policy-making. This means dismantling
the trickle-down theories that assert that the less powerful will eventually benefit from
large-scale infrastructural projects (Oliver-Smith 2010:17). Rather than a capitalist base,
the construction of urban development policies from a socialist standpoint could
plausibly represent all members of society. Rather than centering a project on enhancing
the productive capability of an area, policies should address inequities inherent in
resource distribution. On the ground, these policies would likely embrace the
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mechanisms associated with in-situ upgrading so as not to uproot the social and cultural
complexities in informal settlements.
As far as solutions to this increasingly bleak phenomenon, some scholars are
turning to theories of resistance. Oliver-Smith suggests a Foucauldian understanding of
resistance as “the irreducible opposite of power.” We might read it as the capacity of the
oppressed to “traverse a field of action in new and creative ways.” Rather than one large
resistance movement, Oliver-Smith explains that small acts of resistance that originates
“around specific local community issues,” can, over time, “engage with both individual
interests and broader, more ideological agendas” (Oliver-Smith 2010:17). Though
overthrowing the oppressive forces of capitalism is a broad, unrealistic goal for
resistance, local land-right advocacy organizations such as RISD have the capacity to
interfere in those “specific local community issues.” If Oliver-Smith and his peers are
correct, these small acts of grassroots-led resistance can culminate in resisting the
ideological agenda of global capitalism.
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CONCLUSION
Clearly, there is no singular way to answer the question: why are harmful,
exclusionary urban development policies still in place in Kigali? Any attempt to do so in
a single statement would be hugely problematic. Making the assumption that this is an
“African” problem that naturally occurs during urban development buys into a
developmentalist, social evolutionary critique. Understanding the issue, however, as a
singular phenomenon in which the cruel oppression of vulnerable populations by a
repressive Rwandan government results in displacement is xenophobic and racist; the
complexities of the Rwandan government are informed by an imperialistic past and
similar patterns of displacement are happening worldwide. Attempting to answer the
question by characterizing informal settlement residents as passive victims that need
international intervention is patronizing and doesn’t credit the ingenuities with which
such residents approach their less-than-ideal living situations.
How then should this multilayered, global issue be addressed? From a historical
particularist standpoint, Rwanda’s urban development practices are rooted in a heavily
nationalistic, post-colonial nation-state. Unpacking this statement, Rwanda’s violent past
precipitated the conditions necessary for a militaristically nationalist state. This
nationalism is mobilized by the RPF-controlled government and used to justify
displacement as being a small sacrifice for the whole.
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As a post-colonial state, Rwanda’s urban development strategies are heavily
informed by the constructs of modernism and developmentalism. Ties to international
monetary institutions like the World Bank influence policy-making and thereby, urban
development.
Although these particularities of Rwanda certainly inform the conditions on the
ground and the ways in which residents experience displacement, the question is still not
fully addressed. What causes these conditions is rooted much more deeply than the 1994
genocide. Global capitalism is the strongest force at play in these patterns of exclusion
worldwide, and the only lasting move toward change is active resistance at the grassroots
level and the dismantling of global capitalism.
As Huchzermeyer fiercely advocates, a right to the city is something that must be
made available to all people. The continual eradication of informal settlements worldwide
is a symptom of capitalistic oppression that will always value productivity over the
quality of human life. Until then, I yearn for Huchzermeyer’s vision of the future, in
which all cities provide all inhabitants with, “the right to shape the city and its public
space, the right to permanently inhabit meaningful locations within the city, and the right
to participate in decision-making.” [Huchzermeyer 2011:32]
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APPENDIX A
Questionnaire for Residents
(Please introduce yourself and the purpose of the research and inform the respondent
about the code of conduct)
0.1 Name of interviewer:
0.2 Date of interview:
0.3 Interview start time:
0.4 Interview end time:
Section 1: Biographical Information
(Please explain to the respondent that name and phone number are confidential and will
only be used by RISD in case of further questions)
What is your name?
What is the number of your household in this project (1-29)?
What is your phone number?
1.1 Gender:

male

female

1.2 How old are you?
<18-20 21-30 31-40

41-50

1.3 What is your civil status?
Single
Divorced
Married
Partner

51-60

61-70

Widowed

80

71-80

81-90

>90

Household members
Sex Age Immediate
/Extended
Family or
employee

Education
level

Profession

Time to
work

Method of
traveling to
work

Any special needs
(e.g., extremely
old age, disability,
etc.)?

1.3.Which member is the head of household?
1.4.What is your household average monthly income?
Up to 10,000 RWF
10,001- 30,000 RWF
30,001-50,000 RWF
50,001-70,000 RWF
70,001-90,000 RWF

90,001-110,000 RWF
110,001-130,000
130,001-150,000
150,001-170,000
170,001->200,000

1.3.How long have you and/or your family lived in this area?
<1 year
11-15 years
26-30years
1-5 years
16-20 years
31-35years
6-10 years
21-25 years
36-40 years
1.4.If you moved here, where did you last live?
District:
Sector:
Cell:
Village:
1.5.Why did you move to this place?
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41-45 years
46-50 years
>50 years

1.6.Is someone in your household a member of a cooperative or association in this area?
Yes No
Only if YES
1.6.1.
If yes, what kind of cooperative or association is it (e.g.
agriculture, market)?
1.6.2.
What are the requirements for joining the cooperative or
association?
Age Gender Profession Cash contribution Other
1.7.Is someone in your household a member of any committee in this area?
Youth Committee
Abunzi
Opinion leaders
Women’s Council
Akagoroba k’ababyeyi
GBV Committee
Other
Section 2: Land Rights
2.1. Are you a landowner or a tenant?

Landowner

Tenant

If a tenant, discuss questions 2.5-2.11; if a landowner, discuss questions 2.7-2.12
2.2.

Only if tenant:
Do you have a rent contract? Yes
No
2.2.1. If yes, for how long is the contract?
2.2.2.

What are the conditions to cancel the contract?

2.2.3.

How long is the termination notice period?

2.3.

How long have you rented your current property from your landlord?
<1 year
16-20 years
1-5years
21-25 years
6-10years
26-30 years
11-15years
>30 years

2.4.

How do you communicate with your landlord?
Do not communicate
Email
Phone call
In person
SMS
Send a messenger
Letter
Other
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2.5.

Only if land and property owner:
Do you have a land lease title?

2.6.

What is the duration of your lease according to your title?

2.7.

Do you have a title deed?

2.8.

How did you acquire your land?
Inheritance
Purchase
Gift
Ascending partition

2.9.

2.10.

Yes

Yes

No
Years

No

Land Sharing
Land Compensation
Land allocation by government
Other

How big is your land (in square meters)?
meters squared
(If the landowner doesn’t know at all, ask him to check the land title(s))
Do you have any other property in this area?
Yes No
2.10.1. If yes, what are you using these properties for?

renting

other

2.10.2. How much monthly rent do you collect from all of your properties along

the road?
2.11.

RwF

What are your rights as property owner or renter in case your land or plot is
affected by road upgrading project

Section 3: Awareness and communication
3.1.What do you know about the upgrading program of this road, and how/where did you
first hear about it?
3.2.Why do you think this road is being upgraded?

3.3.Have you held any community meetings to discuss this upgrading project?
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3.4.How many meetings about the road did you or a household member attend?
3.5. What are the different official messages about the project?
3.6.When was this project first introduced to you?
Less than 1 month ago
5-6 months ago
1-2 months ago
7-12 months ago
3-4 months ago
More than a year ago
3.7.During those meetings, were you or anyone in your household given the space to
openly express your own concerns and needs?
3.8. Do you feel that you have enough information/knowledge on this road project?
Why or why not? If you have enough information, tell me what you know about it.
3.9. Do you know of any other official government development plans for your area?
For Kigali? Tell me what you know. (Don’t read them out)
Vision 2020
EDPRS2
City of Kigali Master Plan

District Development Plan
Land Use Master Plan

Section 4: Potential Road Project Consequences
(Refer to section 2, question 2.1. If interviewee is a renter, skip to question 4.3)
4.1. Will this road upgrading project affect your plot directly?
Yes
No
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If yes, how?
4.2.Are you a business owner?
Yes No
4.2.1.
What will be the impact of this road project to the overall business
in this community (If respondent is a business owner, also ask about their
specific business)?
4.3.

What are the benefits of this road-upgrading project to the community?

4.4.

What are the negative impacts of this road on the community?

4.5.If upgrading required you to move from your current location, would you know
where to relocate?
District:
Sector:
Cell:
Village:
I don’t know
4.6.How would you decide where to move?
4.7.What will you require to move, and how much will that cost approximately?
4.8.How much time would you propose for relocation?
Section 5: For people identified for expropriation
5.1.How do you understand the process of expropriation?
5.2.Are you happy with how the expropriation process is being handled in relation to this
road-upgrading project?
Yes No
5.2.1. If yes, what is the process like and what do you like about it?
5.2.2. If no, what do you think is not being done correctly?
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(Refer section 2, question 2.1. If renter, refer to question 5.4.1)
5.3. How much do you think is the value of this property?
RwF / I don’t know
5.4.Do you know what you will be given in compensation for your property?
Yes No
5.3.1. If yes, what will you be given?
5.3.2. If no, what do you think you should be given as compensation?
5.5.Do think you will be compensated fairly? Yes No I don’t know
5.4.1. If yes, why do you think that is a fair compensation?
5.4.2. If no, why do you think this is an unfair compensation?
5.4.3. What do you think should be done for fair compensation?
5.6.Do you have any other experience about expropriation in this area or your
neighborhood?
Yes
No
5.7.If yes, can you share your positive experiences?

5.7.Negative experiences?
Section 6: Dispute management
6.1.What do you see are the likely land-related disputes from the expropriation process of
this road-upgrading project?
6.2.In case of land related disputes that may arise from this project, describe the dispute
management process that may be followed.
6.6.Do you have any additional comments or concerns before we end our conversation?
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APPENDIX B
Questionnaire for local experts
0.1 Name of Interviewer:
0.2 Date of Interview:
0.3 Location of Interview:
0.4 Start time of interview:
0.5 End time of interview:
What is your name?
What is your phone number?
Section One: Biological Information
1.1 At what level are you working/based in?
1.2 What is the name of the sector in which your work is based?
1.3 Do you live in the same sector?

Yes

No

1.4 What cell do you live in?
1.5 What village do you live in?
1.7 What is your job title?
Section Two: Understanding of Development Projects
2.1 What do you know about the Agatare road-upgrading project?
2.2 What do you think are the benefits of this project?
2.3 What do you think are the weaknesses of this project, if any?
2.4 How is the Nyarugenge upgrading plan related to the Kigali City Master Plan or other
development plans?
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2.5 Do you have any other experience with upgrading or expropriation?
2.5.1 If yes, can you share your positive experiences and what was done correctly in the
process?
2.5.2 If yes, can you share your negative experiences or what could have been done
differently?
Section Three: Role in Planning Projects
3.1 What was your role in planning the road-upgrading project?
3.2 What is your role in implementing the road-upgrading project?
3.3 Did you participate in planning meetings related to the project?
3.3.1 If yes, how many meetings did you attend?
3.3.2 If yes, what did these meetings involve and how did you contribute?
3.3.3 If no, why did you not participate in planning meetings?
3.4 What still needs to be done before the implementation of the upgrading project?
Section Four: Communication with Superiors/Community Members
4.1 When and how did you learn about the Road Upgrading Project?
4.2 How do you get information on this project from your supervisors?
4.3 How regularly do you meet community members for discussions on the Road
Upgrading project?
4.4 What are the best methods to sensitize community members about their land and
housing rights during the implementation of the Agatare upgrading project?
Section Five: Landowners’ and Tenants’ Rights
5.1 What are the rights of landowners in regards to upgrading processes and
expropriation?
5.2 What are the rights of tenants in regards to upgrading processes and expropriation?
5.3 How should landowners be compensated in case of public interest?
5.4 How should tenants be compensated in case of public interest?
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